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I. INTRODUCTION 
For a relatively small agency in the federal establishment, the U.S. 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) attracts a good deal of notoriety.  
In part, this stems from the fact that it routinely makes judgments 
affecting human reproduction, including matters such as the over-the-
counter availability of emergency contraceptives,1 approval of the 
 * Visiting Professor, Vanderbilt University Law School (2007–2008); Professor 
of Law, University of Florida. 
 1. See Lars Noah, Treat Yourself: Is Self-Medication the Prescription for What 
Ails American Health Care?, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 359, 374–76 (2006); Rob Stein, 
FDA Approves Plan B’s Over-the-Counter Sale: No Prescription Will Be Required for 
Women 18 or Older, WASH. POST, Aug. 25, 2006, at A4 (“The announcement was aimed 
at resolving one of the longest and highest-profile health controversies of the Bush 




abortifacient drug mifepristone (also known as RU-486),2 regulation of 
fertility treatments,3 and oversight of embryonic stem cell research.4  Not 
surprisingly, the political branches have become increasingly interested 
in the FDA’s decisions in these areas.  One recent agency policy has, 
however, largely escaped notice, even though it raises peculiar questions 
that I have posed elsewhere: 
[D]oes the FDA cross a constitutional line when it purports to require that 
patients undergo periodic pregnancy testing and use contraceptives as a 
condition of access to a drug known to cause birth defects?  If such conditions 
fail to reduce the number of birth defects, could the agency go one step further 
and, at least in the case of teratogens indicated for chronic use, urge sellers to 
require that patients first undergo a sterilization procedure if they wish to use 
the drug?5
This Article tackles that puzzle.  Part II elaborates on the history behind 
the FDA’s distribution restrictions, and Part III finds parallels in other 
contexts where policymakers have considered conditioning access to a 
benefit on the waiver of reproductive rights.  Part IV offers an extended 
analysis of possible constitutional objections to the FDA’s policy. 
administration, but opponents said they are considering plans to block the decision, either 
in court or in Congress.”). 
 2. See Lars Noah, A Miscarriage in the Drug Approval Process?: Mifepristone 
Embroils the FDA in Abortion Politics, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 571 (2001); Marc 
Kaufman, Abortion Foes Want RU-486 Pill Pulled, WASH. POST, May 17, 2006, at A3 
(reporting that opponents have lobbied Congress and petitioned the FDA to withdraw the 
approval). 
 3. See Lars Noah, Assisted Reproductive Technologies and the Pitfalls of 
Unregulated Biomedical Innovation, 55 FLA. L. REV. 603, 648–59 (2003); see also FDA, 
Human Cells, Tissues, and Cellular and Tissue-Based Products: Donor Screening and 
Testing, and Related Labeling, 70 Fed. Reg. 29,949 (May 25, 2005) (codified at 21 
C.F.R. § 1271.90 (2006)) (amending rules to cover cryopreserved embryos later donated 
to someone else). 
 4. See Lars Noah, A Postmodernist Take on the Human Embryo Research 
Debate, 36 CONN. L. REV. 1133, 1144–47 (2004); see also Richard A. Merrill & Bryan J. 
Rose, FDA Regulation of Human Cloning: Usurpation or Statesmanship?, 15 HARV. J.L. 
& TECH. 85 (2001). 
 5. LARS NOAH, LAW, MEDICINE, AND MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY 119 (2d ed. 2007); 
see also Noah, supra note 3, at 664 (“[G]iven the [Supreme] Court’s clear recognition of 
a right to privacy in the context of contraception, one has to wonder about FDA 
distribution restrictions that require patients to use two methods of birth control as a 
condition of access to the teratogens Accutane and Thalomid.”).  The lack of attention to 
this issue strikes me as especially odd given the current administration’s apparent 
antipathy toward promoting the wider use of contraceptives.  See Noah, supra note 4, at 
1145–52; Christopher Lee, Bush Choice for Family-Planning Post Criticized, WASH. 
POST, Nov. 17, 2006, at A1 (“The Bush administration has appointed a new chief of 
family-planning programs at the Department of Health and Human Services who worked 
at a Christian pregnancy-counseling organization that regards the distribution of 
contraceptives as ‘demeaning to women.’”). 
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II. RESTRICTING ACCESS TO TERATOGENIC DRUGS 
In 1982, the FDA approved Hoffmann-La Roche’s application to 
market isotretinoin (Accutane®) for use in patients with severe recalcitrant 
nodular acne.6  Although no one doubts its efficacy in treating this disfiguring 
(though otherwise nonserious) condition,7 the drug is a potent teratogen: 
it carries a significant (more than 25%) risk of miscarriage and major 
birth defects such as facial deformities, severe mental retardation, and 
lethal cardiac abnormalities.8  As further details about the teratogenic 
potential of isotretinoin have emerged over the course of the last quarter 
of a century, the FDA and the manufacturer adopted increasingly aggressive 
mechanisms designed to prevent its use by pregnant women.9
The original labeling revealed that the drug caused fetal abnormalities 
in animals, recommended that physicians not prescribe the drug to 
female patients of childbearing age unless they used an effective form of 
contraception, and suggested that patients who nonetheless become 
pregnant while using the drug receive counseling about the desirability 
of continuing their pregnancies.10  Within one year of approval, after 
reports began to emerge of serious birth defects in humans, Hoffmann-
La Roche revised the drug’s labeling (and took other steps) to draw this 
 6. See Penny Chorlton, FDA Outpaced Firm on Acne Drug, WASH. POST, Sept. 
14, 1982, at A17.  For the current version of the package insert, see Roche Lab., Inc., 
Accutane® Package Insert (Aug. 12, 2005), http://www.rocheusa.com/products/accutane/ 
pi.pdf.  For more background on the drug’s regulatory milestones, including a history of 
its many labeling revisions, see FDA, Isotretinoin (Marketed as Accutane) Capsule 
Information (Oct. 6, 2006), http://www.fda.gov/cder/drug/infopage/accutane/default.htm.  
Starting in 2002, generic versions of the drug became available (sold under the tradenames 
Amnesteem®, Claravis®, and Sotret®).  See Gideon Koren et al., Generic Isotretinoin: A 
New Risk for Unborn Children, 170 CAN. MED. ASS’N J. 1567 (2004). 
 7. See Aamir Haider & James C. Shaw, Treatment of Acne Vulgaris, 292 JAMA 
726, 731 (2004); William D. James, Acne, 352 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1463, 1469–70 (2005). 
 8. See Edward J. Lammer et al., Retinoic Acid Embryopathy, 313 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 837, 839–40 (1985).  David Graham, the FDA whistleblower who attracted attention 
after the withdrawal of Vioxx® (rofecoxib), reiterated in congressional testimony his 
longstanding views that the agency should withdraw approval of isotretinoin.  See Marc 
Kaufman, Attempt to Discredit Whistle-Blower Alleged, WASH. POST, Nov. 24, 2004, at 
A19. 
 9. See Ami E. Doshi, Comment, The Cost of Clear Skin: Balancing the Social 
and Safety Costs of iPLEDGE with the Efficacy of Accutane (Isotretinoin), 37 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 625, 630–45 (2007); see also id. at 659–60 (concluding that the FDA 
should withdraw approval). 
 10. See Joan H. Krause, Accutane: Has Drug Regulation in the United States 
Reached Its Limits?, 6 J.L. & HEALTH 1, 17 (1991). 




information to the attention of physicians.11  In 1988, because these 
enhanced warnings did not entirely prevent prescribing of the drug to 
women who became pregnant,12 the FDA persuaded the manufacturer to 
develop a “Pregnancy Prevention Program” (PPP) that supplied physicians 
with kits containing patient informed consent forms and other educational 
materials.13  Revised labeling urged physicians to perform pregnancy 
tests before prescribing the drug to their female patients, but this and other 
aspects of the program lacked any mechanism for ensuring compliance. 
In 2000, after receiving reports of gestational exposures caused by 
failures in using hormonal contraceptives, the manufacturer revised the 
labeling to recommend the use of two different forms of contraception.14  
In 2001, when the FDA realized that these additional warnings and 
related voluntary measures had still not prevented all use by pregnant 
women,15 the agency approved SMART™ (System to Manage Accutane-
 11. See Paul J. Benke, The Isotretinoin Teratogen Syndrome, 251 JAMA 3267, 
3267 (1984); Roche Labs., Accutane Contraindicated in Pregnancy, 252 JAMA 2623 
(1984). 
 12. See CDC, Birth Defects Caused by Isotretinoin—New Jersey, 37 MORBIDITY & 
MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 171 (1988); Robert S. Stern, When a Uniquely Effective Drug Is 
Teratogenic: The Case of Isotretinoin, 320 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1007, 1008 (1989); 
Michael Abramowitz & Philip J. Hilts, FDA Eyes Ban on Acne Drug: Study Links Use 
by Pregnant Women to Birth Defects, WASH. POST, Apr. 23, 1988, at A1; Michael 
Waldholz, FDA Panel Suggests Strict Limits on Use of Acne Drug That Causes Birth 
Defects, WALL ST. J., Apr. 27, 1988, at A3.  Enhanced warnings of belatedly discovered 
drug risks often have little impact on prescribing behavior.  See Lars Noah, Medicine’s 
Epistemology: Mapping the Haphazard Diffusion of Knowledge in the Biomedical 
Community, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 373, 438–40 (2002). 
 13. See Lawrence K. Altman, U.S. Orders Curbs on Drug Linked to Birth Defects, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 1988, at A1 (adding that “Roche was taking another unusual step in 
offering to pay the costs of counseling for contraception and pregnancy tests for any 
woman for whom Accutane is prescribed”); Judith Willis, New Warning About Accutane 
and Birth Defects, FDA CONSUMER, Oct. 1988, at 26.  Within a couple of years, 
questions surfaced about the PPP’s effectiveness, but the FDA declined to order more 
drastic restrictions at that time.  See Charles Marwick, Additional Steps Proposed to 
Ensure Antiacne Drug Used Only in Appropriate Patient Population, 263 JAMA 3125 
(1990); William Booth, Education Drive on Risks of Accutane Said to Fail, WASH. POST, 
May 22, 1990, at A9.  The manufacturer had included an enrollment form for patients to 
send to the Slone Epidemiology Unit at Boston University’s School of Public Health that 
facilitated the tracking of patient compliance and adverse outcomes.  See Allen A. 
Mitchell et al., A Pregnancy-Prevention Program in Women of Childbearing Age 
Receiving Isotretinoin, 333 NEW ENG. J. MED. 101, 104–05 (1995) (concluding that the 
PPP worked fairly well). 
 14. See Michelle Meadows, The Power of Accutane: The Benefits and Risks of a 
Breakthrough Acne Drug, FDA CONSUMER, Mar.–Apr. 2001, at 18, 20.  As lower dosage 
formulations of hormonal contraceptives have become more popular, their failure rates 
have increased.  See Anna Wilde Mathews, FDA Mulls Birth-Control Standards, WALL 
ST. J., Jan. 19, 2007, at B5. 
 15. See, e.g., CDC, Accutane®-Exposed Pregnancies—California, 1999, 49 
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 28 (2000); Kenneth Lyons Jones et al., Letter to 
the Editor, Isotretinoin and Pregnancy, 285 JAMA 2079 (2001). 
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Related Teratogenicity), a still more aggressive risk management program 
developed by Hoffmann-La Roche.  SMART attempted to require (through 
physician registration with the manufacturer and use of special qualification 
stickers as a prerequisite for dispensing by pharmacists) a negative 
pregnancy test before prescribing a nonrefillable one month supply in 
addition to an agreement by patients to use two methods of contraception or 
abstain from sexual activity.16  The agency modeled this program on a 
similar effort undertaken by the manufacturer of Thalomid® (thalidomide), 
which the FDA had approved for the treatment of Hansen’s disease 
(leprosy): STEPS™ (System for Thalidomide Education and Prescribing 
Safety) sought to ensure that this infamous teratogen stay out of the 
hands of persons who might become pregnant.17  Because semen could 
carry residues of thalidomide, male patients also had to agree to use 
contraceptives.18
In 2005, because SMART had not entirely lived up to expectations, 
the FDA approved the iPLEDGE™ risk management program established 
by the manufacturers of isotretinoin, which required prescribers, distributors, 
and patients to register (on-line or by using a toll-free number) and attest 
to their understanding of the risks and commitment to abide by the 
pregnancy testing and contraception requirements.19  Physicians and 
 16. See Diane Knich, Accutane: New Rules Debut, WASH. POST, Apr. 9, 2002, at 
F1; see also Margaret A. Honein et al., Can We Ensure the Safe Use of Known Human 
Teratogens?: Introduction of Generic Isotretinoin in the US As an Example, 27 DRUG 
SAFETY 1069, 1072 (2004); id. at 1075 (explaining that each generic version uses a 
parallel risk management program). 
 17. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Thalidomide Approved to Treat Leprosy, with Other 
Uses Seen, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 1998, at A1 (“If any doctors or pharmacists refuse to 
comply with the distribution rules, their privileges to prescribe or dispense the drug 
might be revoked.”); Jamie Talan, Thalidomide’s Legacy, WASH. POST, Jan. 4, 2000, at 
F10; cf. Michael E. Weinblatt, Editorial, Methotrexate for Chronic Diseases in Adults, 
332 NEW ENG. J. MED. 330, 331 (1995) (explaining that low doses of this chemotherapy 
agent may help treat autoimmune diseases, but warning that its teratogenicity means that 
female patients should not become pregnant).  Celgene also sells Revlimid® (lenalidomide), a 
thalidomide derivate for multiple myeloma subject to the same distribution restrictions 
(under the RevAssist™ program).  See Revlimid Homepage, http://www.revlimid.com 
(last visited June 14, 2007). 
 18. See Rita Rubin, Thalidomide Could Guide Use of Drugs That Risk Birth 
Defects, USA TODAY, July 22, 1998, at 7D.  Given the far more limited range of options 
and lower reliability of contraceptives for men, male patients would have to ensure that 
their female partners use contraceptives (otherwise, one wonders whether the FDA might 
have called for vasectomies as a condition for access). 
 19. See Laurel Naversen Geraghty, Doctors Fear Acne Drug Rules Go Too Far, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2006, at G3; Gardiner Harris, F.D.A. Imposes Tougher Rules for 
Acne Drug, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2005, at A1 (“The new program is the latest and by far 




patients have expressed frustration about the sometimes cumbersome 
barriers to access erected by iPLEDGE, but at least initially the program 
has succeeded where its predecessors had failed—namely, in preventing 
pregnancies among users of the drug.20  In contrast with the gradual 
adoption of ever tighter access requirements for isotretinoin in this 
country, British regulators long ago imposed even more stringent distribution 
restrictions, including a requirement that patients agree to undergo an 
immediate abortion in case they become pregnant while using the drug.21
Over the last two decades, and in parallel with the FDA’s incremental 
approach to addressing Accutane’s teratogenicity, victims have pursued 
tort litigation against Hoffmann-La Roche.  For the most part, courts 
have rejected inadequate warning claims.22  In one recent case, a woman 
most drastic of more than 40 efforts by the agency in the last 22 years to reduce harm 
from Accutane . . . while allowing its continued use.”). 
 20. See Sandra G. Boodman, Too Hard to Take: A Strict New Acne Drug Program 
May Prevent Birth Defects, but Many Complain It Also Drives People Away from a 
Potentially Life-Transforming Treatment, WASH. POST, Sept. 5, 2006, at F1 (“Public 
health officials say such strict regulation is necessary because years of progressively 
stronger voluntary programs failed to prevent pregnancy in users of the medicine . . . .”); 
id. (“Between 1982 and 2005, 2,796 pregnancies among women who used Accutane 
were reported to the FDA . . . .  Most ended in abortion or miscarriage, but the birth of 
194 babies with defects caused by the drug were reported to the FDA.  The actual 
numbers are believed to be far higher . . . .”).  The latest figures are, however, far less 
encouraging.  See Anti-Pregnancy Effort Fails, WASH. POST, July 31, 2007, at A10 (“The 
new figures show the 122 pregnancies reported in the first year of the iPledge program 
are about the same as the number reported annually before the FDA tightened 
restrictions on the drug . . . .”). 
 21. See Gina Kolata, Europeans Placed Stiffer Curbs on Acne Drug, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 28, 1988, at A1 (adding that only three pregnancies had been reported in 
isotretinoin users outside of North America).  These sorts of marketing restrictions, 
though imposed by the government, represent a type of “precommitment strategy” that 
some commentators have endorsed as a mechanism for resolving disputes in connection 
with reproductive decisionmaking.  See John A. Robertson, Precommitment Strategies 
for Disposition of Frozen Embryos, 50 EMORY L.J. 989, 1046 (2001); cf. id. at 1022–23, 
1041 (recognizing that precommitments requiring bodily intrusions at a future time 
might be difficult to enforce); John A. Robertson, Liberalism and the Limits of 
Procreative Liberty: A Response to My Critics, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 233, 259 n.95 
(1995) (“In very extreme circumstances of compelling interest, forced abortion or 
contraception might be appropriate, but such cases will be extremely rare.”); John A. 
Robertson, Precommitment Issues in Bioethics, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1849, 1869 (2003) (“[A 
gestational surrogate] should not be specifically ordered to abort or undergo prenatal 
tests.  However, she could still be required to pay damages for the loss caused the couple 
from violating her promise that she would screen . . . the fetus prior to birth and continue 
(or terminate) the pregnancy . . . .”). 
 22. See, e.g., Gerber v. Hoffmann-La Roche Inc., 392 F. Supp. 2d 907, 916–20 
(S.D. Tex. 2005) (holding that the 1983 warning was adequate as a matter of law 
notwithstanding the failure to recommend the use of more than one form of 
contraception); Hunt v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 785 F. Supp. 547, 550 (D. Md. 1992) 
(holding that the 1984 warning was adequate as a matter of law notwithstanding the 
failure to recommend an initial pregnancy test); Bealer v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 729 
F. Supp. 43, 44–45 (E.D. La. 1990) (holding, in a case where the patient underwent a 
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who received a prescription for Accutane in 1995 (under the terms of the 
PPP, including the completion of a detailed patient informed consent 
form) sued for an alleged failure to warn after she had opted for 
abstinence rather than contraception but then failed to remain celibate 
and subsequently gave birth to a profoundly disabled child.23  In affirming 
the trial judge’s decision to dismiss the complaint, the court explained: 
“We cannot conclude that Roche had a duty to withhold from Ms. 
Banner a medication her doctor determined was an appropriate treatment 
for her unless she agreed to the use of contraceptive techniques that may 
have violated her religious principles.”24  In another case, however, a 
child born with birth defects recovered damages from a physician who 
negligently had prescribed Accutane to an already pregnant woman and 
failed to secure the patient’s written consent or follow other aspects of 
the PPP.25
The FDA has approved a number of teratogenic drugs other than 
isotretinoin and thalidomide, but it generally has not subjected these 
drugs to the same distribution restrictions.26  For instance, a topical 
therapeutic abortion after becoming pregnant, that the 1987 warning was adequate as a 
matter of law); Felix v. Hoffmann–LaRoche, Inc., 540 So. 2d 102, 103–05 (Fla. 1989) 
(holding that the 1982 warning was adequate as a matter of law). 
 23. See Banner v. Hoffmann-La Roche Inc., 891 A.2d 1229, 1231–33 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 2006).  “According to plaintiffs, Roche should have warned that all 
women of child-bearing age who were married or sexually active should use two forms 
of birth control, even if they indicated an intent not to engage in sexual activity while 
taking Accutane.”  Id. at 1234 (“Plaintiffs assert that Roche knew or should have known 
that women of child-bearing age who were married or sexually active were unlikely to 
remain abstinent.”); id. (“Plaintiffs also asserted that Roche was at fault for not 
restricting the physicians authorized to prescribe Accutane.  They pointed to a registry 
program instituted by another pharmaceutical company, Celgene, in connection with that 
company’s distribution of thalidomide . . . .”).
 24. Id. at 1241; see also id. at 1237–40 (explaining that the warnings used in 1995 
were adequate as a matter of law notwithstanding the inclusion of abstinence as an 
alternative to using two forms of contraception). 
 25. See Hogle v. Hall, 916 P.2d 814, 816–17 (Nev. 1996) (noting that the medical 
defendants had impleaded the mother as a joint tortfeasor and that the jury had allocated 
40% of the responsibility to her for incorrectly informing the physician that she had just 
experienced a menstrual period). 
 26. See Kathleen Uhl et al., Risk Management Strategies in the Physicians’ Desk 
Reference Product Labels for Pregnancy Category X Drugs, 25 DRUG SAFETY 885, 887–
91 (2002) (reviewing the package inserts of more than 100 drugs contraindicated for use 
during pregnancy, and finding that only thirteen included recommendations that 
physicians conduct pregnancy testing, encourage the use of contraception, or both).  In 
addition, the FDA authorized the sale of a class of mild teratogens (nicotine replacement 
products) without requiring either a prescription or consumer labeling that fully describes 
the risk of use during pregnancy.  See Dowhal v. SmithKline Beecham Consumer Healthcare, 




retinoid for the treatment of acne and psoriasis (tazarotene) carries a 
similar risk of birth defects (as revealed in its labeling) and 
recommendations for pregnancy testing and contraceptive use, but it does 
not include any special limitations on access.27  Tegison® (etretinate), 
another vitamin A derivative for treating severe psoriasis, carried an 
even higher risk of causing birth defects—in part because (unlike 
isotretinoin) it persists long after a patient discontinues use, which would 
necessitate long-acting contraception or sterilization—but faced no 
distribution restrictions.28  The labeling for Tegison’s successor Soriatane® 
(acitretin) does, however, include a risk management program similar to 
that used for isotretinoin and thalidomide.29  The labeling for the antiviral 
Rebetol® (ribavirin) recommends a negative pregnancy test as well as the 
use of two contraceptives (and for both male and female patients) 
continuing for six months after the cessation of this therapy for hepatitis C.30 
The FDA also imposed restrictions on access when it approved the 
controversial abortifacient Mifeprex® (mifepristone).  Concerns existed 
about birth defects in the event of product failure (which could, for 
instance, happen if a pregnant woman ingested only the initial dose of 
the drug but then changed her mind), so patients had to abide by a 
protocol that included a follow-up visit for the administration of a 
second drug (misoprostol) to complete the abortion.31  In effect, the 
88 P.3d 1, 4–5, 15 (Cal. 2004) (holding that this decision preempted a contrary 
warning requirement imposed under state law). 
 27. See Allergan, Tazorac® Package Insert (May 2004), http://www.tazorac. com/PDFs/ 
Tazorac_Cream_Full_PI.pdf.  Similar recommendations appear in the labeling for Tracleer® 
(bosentan), a treatment for primary pulmonary hypertension.  See Actelion, Tracleer® 
Package Insert (Feb. 15, 2007), http://www.tracleer.com/pdf%5CPI_4pg_ TR2454_ 
032707_FINAL.pdf. 
 28. See Gina Kolata, A Second Skin Drug Is Called Major Threat for Birth 
Defects, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 1988, § 1, at 1.  In 1999, after introducing Soriatane® 
(acitretin), the manufacturer ceased marketing the drug and asked the FDA to withdraw 
approval, which the agency did four years later.  See FDA, Notice, Hoffmann-La Roche, 
Inc.: Withdrawal of Approval of a New Drug Application, 68 Fed. Reg. 53,384, 53,385 
(Sept. 10, 2003). 
 29. See Uhl et al., supra note 26, at 888–90. 
 30. See Schering Corp., Rebetol® Package Insert (July 2004), http://www.spfiles. 
com/pirebetol.pdf. 
 31. See Noah, supra note 2, at 574–75 & n.12, 585–86; Gina Kolata, U.S. 
Approves Abortion Pill, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2000, at A1 (“A woman will be given 
written instructions . . . , and her doctor must sign a statement saying they have read the 
instructions and will comply with them exactly.”); John Leland, Abortion Might 
Outgrow Its Need for Roe v. Wade, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2005, § 4, at 14 (reporting that 
the off-label use of the ulcer drug Cytotec® (misoprostol) alone may cause birth defects 
if it fails to induce a miscarriage).  The Patient Agreement for Mifeprex includes the 
following statement: “I understand that if my pregnancy continues after any part of the 
treatment [as happens in 5–8% of cases], there is a chance that there may be birth 
defects. . . .  I will talk with my provider about my choices, which may include a surgical 
procedure to end my pregnancy.”  Patient Agreement, Mifeprex (Mifepristone) Tablets 
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agency decided that patients had to use these drugs in tandem.  Along 
similar lines, perhaps it makes sense to view hormonal contraceptives as 
necessary concomitant treatments for women using other teratogens.32 
Could the FDA go further still and, taking a cue from its British counterpart, 
insist that women who become pregnant while using a teratogen take an 
abortifacient drug?33  Or, instead of relying on agreements by patients 
and physicians, could the agency demand that the manufacturer sell a 
bundled product (for example, a single pill that combined a teratogen 
with a hormonal contraceptive),34 at least when indicated for use by 
female patients?35
(July 19, 2005), http://www.fda.gov/cder/drug/infopage/mifepristone/patientAgreement 
20050719.pdf; cf. Sheppard-Mobley v. King, 830 N.E.2d 301, 303 (N.Y. 2005) (summarizing 
tort claims brought on behalf of an infant whose mother declined to undergo a surgical 
abortion after a nonsurgical abortion using the drug methotrexate failed and caused 
serious birth defects). 
 32. Cf. Noah, supra note 3, at 644 (“[O]ne might view selective reduction as a 
necessary adjunct to ARTs that may result in the implantation of multiple embryos.”).  
Similar questions might arise in connection with other medical interventions (for 
example, radiation and chemotherapy) that may cause permanent chromosomal damage 
to a patient’s germ cells, which would make any subsequent efforts at procreation 
inadvisable.  Because these interventions also create a risk of infertility, patients 
sometimes store reproductive tissues for future use before undergoing such treatments.  
See Anne Reichman Schiff, Arising from the Dead: Challenges of Posthumous 
Procreation, 75 N.C. L. REV. 901, 905 & n.16 (1997).  Assuming that a treatment did not 
cause infertility but might adversely affect a patient’s future children, could the 
government insist on permanent contraception (that is, sterilization) as a condition of 
access to the intervention? 
 33. Cf. Noah, supra note 2, at 576 (describing the range of abortifacient drugs 
available in the United States); id. at 589 (explaining that “the labeling for one drug may 
direct physicians to make use of another drug in order to counteract a particular side 
effect”).  Would-be fathers have no right to insist that a pregnant woman undergo an 
abortion or, conversely, prevent her from doing so.  See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. 
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 896 (1992) (plurality opinion); Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. 
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 71 (1976).  In one publicized case, biological parents unsuccessfully 
sought to insist that their surrogate comply with a contractual provision for selective 
reduction when she developed a twin pregnancy.  See New Parents Found for Surrogate’s 
Twins, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2001, at B7.  See generally supra note 21 (discussing precommitment 
strategies). 
 34. For instance, under government pressure to reduce the rampant abuse of 
OxyContin® (oxycodone), the manufacturer announced plans to add an ingredient 
(naltrexone) that could deactivate the opioid analgesic when crushed.  See Lars Noah, 
Challenges in the Federal Regulation of Pain Management Technologies, 31 J.L. MED. 
& ETHICS 55, 62 (2003); see also Sandra Blakeslee, Drug Makers Hope to Kill the Kick 
in Pain Relief, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2004, at F1 (reporting that another approach 
involves adding a chemical irritant such as capsaicin); Marc Kaufman, Drug Firms 
Trying to Make Painkillers Less Abusable, WASH. POST, June 14, 2004, at A7 (noting 




III. CONDITIONS ON PROCREATION IN OTHER CONTEXTS 
Two decades ago, in order to prevent perinatal transmission of the 
AIDS virus, the U.S. Centers for Disease Control (CDC) announced that 
HIV-positive women should not become pregnant.36  Recognizing that 
this recommendation would have only a limited impact, a few commentators 
went further in suggesting mandatory screening of already pregnant 
women,37 while some physicians evidently insisted that their infected 
female patients remain abstinent: 
Comments by health professionals to the effect that they will not provide 
prenatal or other medical care to [HIV-positive] women who decide to bear children 
constitute a more aggressive influence strategy.  Although nowhere advocated 
in print, such pressure may have been endemic in clinical practice. . . .  The 
reproductive forbearance requested might range from a promise not to become 
pregnant to the use of a particular contraceptive method or even consent to 
abortion.  In addition, some have expressed concern about a more extreme 
prospect—that providers could condition their services upon consent to 
sterilization.38
that “some combination drugs that might reduce the abuse potential of painkillers are 
also likely to reduce their effectiveness”). 
 35. Although rare, the FDA has approved certain drugs for use by only members 
of one sex.  See, e.g., FDA, Avodart Consumer Information (Nov. 22, 2002), 
http://www.fda.gov/cder/consumerinfo/druginfo/avodart.htm (“Dutasteride is for men 
only. . . .  [W]omen who are pregnant or may be pregnant should not touch Avodart because 
it can pass through their skin and may cause a birth defect in their male baby.”); Uhl et 
al., supra note 26, at 887 (finding that almost a dozen drugs contraindicated during 
pregnancy are intended for use only in males); Marc Kaufman, FDA Reapproves Bowel 
Drug After Pulling It for Safety, WASH. POST, June 8, 2002, at A4 (reporting that 
Lotronex is only approved for use by women).  At least in the case of isotretinoin, such a 
combination product would make additional sense because hormonal contraceptives also 
help to treat acne in women.  See Jane E. Brody, The Pill at 40: New Uses for a Drug 
That Changed Society, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2000, at F1 (“[O]ne product, Ortho Tri-
Cyclen, has received F.D.A. approval to treat moderate cystic acne in women 15 or older 
who desire contraception and who have not been helped by topical acne remedies.”). 
 36. See CDC, Recommendations for Assisting in the Prevention of Perinatal 
Transmission of Human T-Lymphotropic Virus Type III/Lymphadenopathy-Associated 
Virus and Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome, 34 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. 
REP. 721, 724–25 (1985); see also CDC, Childbearing and Contraceptive-Use Plans 
Among Women at High Risk for HIV Infection, 41 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 
135, 144 (1992). 
 37. See, e.g., Carole A. Campbell, Women and AIDS, 30 SOC. SCI. & MED. 407, 
410 (1990).  In 1995, the government recommended the testing of all pregnant women.  
See U.S. Public Health Service Recommendations for Human Immunodeficiency Virus 
Counseling and Voluntary Testing for Pregnant Women, 44 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY 
WKLY. REP. RR-7 (1995). 
 38. M. Gregg Bloche, Beyond Autonomy: Coercion and Morality in Clinical 
Relationships, 6 HEALTH MATRIX 229, 239 (1996) (footnotes omitted); see also id. at 
250–51, 255–56, 262–63, 300–01 (evaluating the legitimacy of such conditions); id. at 
239–40 (“Additional influence strategies are possible at the public health level.  These 
range from the public promotion of reproductive abstinence via mass media campaigns 
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In the face of suggestions that the government codify restrictions of this 
sort, critics assailed such proposals as threatening an unconstitutional 
interference with procreative liberties and intrusion upon bodily integrity.39
Could the FDA instead have made contraceptive use a condition of 
access to AIDS drugs by women of childbearing years?  Unlike proposals 
for mandatory screening and sterilization of HIV-positive women, 
patients theoretically would remain free to decline, but such a condition 
on access seems more attenuated than in the case of teratogens because 
the AIDS drugs themselves do not pose any risk of fetal injury.40  In any 
event, with the advent of new treatments, including methods for reducing 
the risk of perinatal transmission,41 the original reasons for discouraging 
pregnancy in HIV-positive patients largely have disappeared. 
Fifteen years ago, shortly after the FDA approved the long-acting 
contraceptive implant Norplant® (levonorgestrel),42 controversy erupted 
over proposed incentives designed to encourage its use by welfare 
to the creation of financial and other material incentives to refrain from childbearing.” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
 39. See John D. Arras, AIDS and Reproductive Decisions: Having Children in 
Fear and Trembling, 68 MILBANK Q. 353, 373 (1990); Suzanne Sangree, Control of 
Childbearing by HIV Positive Women: Some Responses to Emerging Legal Policies, 41 
BUFF. L. REV. 309, 395–414, 424–35 (1993) (assuming that “only” 30% of children 
delivered by HIV-positive women would become infected in this manner); id. at 429 
(predicting that, because of risks associated with intrauterine devices, “neither the[ir] 
manufacturers nor the FDA would sanction the compulsory use of IUDs” by HIV-
positive women); see also id. at 414–23, 435–41 (raising similar objections to proposals 
for HIV screening of pregnant women). 
 40. Cf. Heather S. Dixon, Pelvic Exam Prerequisite to Hormonal Contraceptives: 
Unjustified Infringement on Constitutional Rights, Governmental Coercion, and Bad 
Public Policy, 27 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 177, 209–17 (2004) (arguing that publicly funded 
family planning clinics cannot condition access to oral contraceptives on intrusive exams 
that serve only collateral purposes); id. at 216 (recognizing the peculiarity that “both the 
right being exercised [bodily integrity] and the subject of the subsidy itself [access to 
effective contraception] are constitutional entitlements”); id. at 231–32 (concluding that, 
while physicians should discuss risks and separately might encourage a pelvic exam, 
women retain the right to make an informed choice to use oral contraceptives without 
first undergoing such an exam); Felicia H. Stewart et al., Clinical Breast and Pelvic 
Examination Requirements for Hormonal Contraception, 285 JAMA 2232, 2236 (2001). 
 41. See Marc Santora, U.S. Is Close to Eliminating AIDS in Infants, Officials Say, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2005, § 1, at 1. 
 42. Products liability litigation ultimately helped to drive Norplant from the 
marketplace.  See Lars Noah, Triage in the Nation’s Medicine Cabinet: The Puzzling 
Scarcity of Vaccines and Other Drugs, 54 S.C. L. REV. 741, 760 n.87 (2003).  
Nonetheless, manufacturers continue to introduce new long-acting contraceptive drugs 
and devices.  See Shari Roan, Now, a Birth Control Bonanza, L.A. TIMES, July 10, 2006, 
at F1. 




recipients.43  A number of commentators assailed such plans as amounting 
to unconstitutional conditions.44  After states failed to adopt proposals to 
encourage contraceptive use by persons on welfare, a private organization 
sponsored an initiative to reduce unwanted or hazardous pregnancies: 
Project Prevention offered $200 to any substance abusers who opted for 
a long-acting contraceptive.45  Although widely denounced for its methods 
and message,46 no one seriously suggested that the program violated any 
existing laws. 
Separately, a few judges tried to make the implantation of Norplant a 
condition of probation.47  Again, several commentators criticized such 
 43. See Tamar Lewin, 5-Year Contraceptive Implant Seems Headed for Wide Use, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 1991, at A1 (describing proposals in Kansas and Louisiana); Adam 
Pertman, Long-lasting Contraceptive Comes Under Fire, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 3, 1994, 
at A3 (“Lawmakers have tried unsuccessfully in many states, including Maryland and 
Connecticut, to provide monetary incentives for women on welfare to receive Norplant.”). 
 44. See, e.g., David S. Coale, Note, Norplant Bonuses and the Unconstitutional 
Conditions Doctrine, 71 TEX. L. REV. 189, 204–15 (1992) (arguing that such programs 
would intrude upon the constitutional rights to privacy, bodily integrity, and the free 
exercise of religion); John Robert Hand, Note, Buying Fertility: The Constitutionality of 
Welfare Bonuses for Welfare Mothers Who Submit to Norplant Insertion, 46 VAND. L. 
REV. 715, 718–23, 744–50 (1993) (focusing on the privacy objections, but cautioning 
that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine may not come into play here); see also 
AMA Bd. of Trustees, Requirements or Incentives by Government for the Use of Long-
Acting Contraceptives, 267 JAMA 1818, 1821 (1992).  But see Kimberly A. Smith, 
Note, Conceivable Sterilization: A Constitutional Analysis of a Norplant/Depo-Provera 
Welfare Condition, 77 IND. L.J. 389 (2002) (defending the constitutionality of supplemental 
payments to encourage the use of long-acting contraceptives, distinguishing between 
temporary and permanent sterilization). 
 45. See Jane Gilbert Mauldon, Providing Subsidies and Incentives for Norplant, 
Sterilization and Other Contraception: Allowing Economic Theory to Inform Ethical 
Analysis, 31 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 351, 354–55, 358–61 (2003) (describing and defending 
this effort); Jennifer Mott Johnson, Note, Reproductive Ability for Sale, Do I Hear 
$200?: Private Cash-for-Contraception Agreements As an Alternative to Maternal 
Substance Abuse, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 205, 223–43 (2001) (same, and distinguishing the 
public policy concerns that have led to restrictions on surrogacy agreements between 
private parties). 
 46. See Adam B. Wolf, Note, What Money Cannot Buy: A Legislative Response to 
C.R.A.C.K., 33 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 173 (2000); Avram Goldstein, Group to Pay 
Addicts to Take Birth Control, WASH. POST, June 26, 2000, at B1; Cecilia M. Vega, 
Sterilization Offer to Addicts Reopens Ethics Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2003, at B1.  In 
contrast, evidently no one has criticized an incentive program created by Planned 
Parenthood to discourage second pregnancies by teenage girls.  See Bonnie Steinbock, 
Coercion and Long-Term Contraceptives, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Jan.–Feb. 1995, at 
S19, S21–22 (applauding the “Dollar-a-Day” program in Denver); Dyan Zaslowsky, 
Denver Program Curbs Teen-Agers’ Pregnancy, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 1989, at A8. 
 47. See People v. Walsh, 593 N.W.2d 558, 558 (Mich. 1999) (Corrigan, J., 
concurring); Sally Jacobs, Norplant Draws Concerns over Risks, Coercion, BOSTON 
GLOBE, Dec. 21, 1992, at A1; Tamar Lewin, Implanted Birth Control Device Renews 
Debate over Forced Contraception, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 1991, at A20; John Makeig, 
Surgical Deterrent: Mom Convicted of Child Abuse Picks Birth-Control Implant over 
Prison, HOUS. CHRON., Mar. 6, 1992, at A1; see also Dee McAree, Deadbeat Dads Face 
Ban on Procreation, NAT’L L.J., May 31, 2004, at 4 (reporting that a family court judge 
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conditions on constitutional grounds.48  On those occasions where probationers 
have challenged similar conditions (barring pregnancy though without 
specifying a particular method of birth control), appellate courts generally 
have rejected them as improper.49  In one case involving a mother prosecuted 
for child endangerment based on her severe dietary restrictions, the court 
accepted the need to prevent another pregnancy because of the risk of 
prenatal injury, but it still invalidated the condition because other less 
restrictive means existed to prevent injury in the event of a subsequent 
pregnancy.50
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 
If the constitutional objections lodged against other attempts to limit 
procreation might have some merit, then the FDA’s conditions on access 
to teratogenic drugs deserve closer scrutiny.  Historically, this agency 
has not paid much attention to statutory or constitutional obstacles that 
in Kentucky had offered some fathers who were in contempt of child support orders the 
option of vasectomies in lieu of spending a month in jail). 
 48. See, e.g., Janet F. Ginzberg, Note, Compulsory Contraception as a Condition 
of Probation: The Use and Abuse of Norplant, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 979, 1001–18 (1992) 
(arguing that, notwithstanding the diminished constitutional protections afforded to 
probationers, such a condition on probation for persons convicted of child abuse 
unreasonably infringes upon rights related to privacy, procreation, and bodily integrity); 
James H. Taylor, Note, Court-Ordered Contraception: Norplant as a Probation 
Condition in Child Abuse, 44 FLA. L. REV. 379, 406–16 (1992); Kristyn M. Walker, 
Note, Judicial Control of Reproductive Freedom: The Use of Norplant as a Condition of 
Probation, 78 IOWA L. REV. 779, 797–807 (1993).  But see Thomas E. Bartrum, Note, 
Birth Control as a Condition of Probation—A New Weapon in the War Against Child 
Abuse, 80 KY. L.J. 1037, 1047–53 (1992) (defending their constitutionality). 
 49. See, e.g., People v. Ferrell, 659 N.E.2d 992 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995); State v. 
Mosburg, 768 P.2d 313, 315 (Kan. Ct. App. 1989); State v. Richard, 680 N.E.2d 667, 
670 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996); see also State v. Talty, 814 N.E.2d 1201 (Ohio 2004) 
(invalidating probation condition for a deadbeat dad).  But cf. In re Bobbijean P., No. 
03626-03, 2004 WL 834480, at *2–3 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2004) (ordering the parents of 
several crack babies to stop procreating); State v. Kline, 963 P.2d 697, 698–99 (Or. Ct. 
App. 1998) (involving a father convicted of child abuse); State v. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d 
200, 201–02 (Wis. 2001) (involving a father who refused to pay child support). 
 50. See People v. Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. 357, 364–65 & n.9 (Ct. App. 1984); see 
also Stacey L. Arthur, The Norplant Prescription: Birth Control, Woman Control, or 
Crime Control?, 40 UCLA L. REV. 1, 69–83 (1992) (questioning the latter aspect of the 
court’s decision, and documenting subsequent acts of child endangerment that would not 
have occurred had the defendant used contraceptives during her probationary period); cf. 
People v. Zaring, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 263, 265, 271 (Ct. App. 1992) (invalidating a 
condition designed to prevent a heroin abuser from having an addicted baby); Trammell 
v. State, 751 N.E.2d 283, 285–86, 290–91 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (vacating condition 
imposed after neglect by mentally retarded mother caused child’s death). 




stand in the way of pursuing its mission to protect the public health,51 
and perhaps no one would ever actually try to test the validity of these 
distribution restrictions, but their lawfulness remains very much in doubt. 
A. Finding State Action 
Would a requirement making contraception a prerequisite for access to 
a prescription drug survive a constitutional challenge?  As a threshold 
matter, anyone wishing to mount such a challenge would have to find 
some “state action” underlying the condition.52  If a nongovernmental 
entity imposed the condition, then constitutional constraints become 
inapplicable, though statutes may impose parallel limitations on private 
actors.53  In other words, the Constitution would not prevent a physician 
in private practice from adopting a policy of prescribing Accutane (or 
some other teratogen) only if a patient first agreed to use contraceptives 
(or to undergo an abortion in the event of a pregnancy).54  Similarly, the 
 51. See Lars Noah, Interpreting Agency Enabling Acts: Misplaced Metaphors in 
Administrative Law, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1463, 1488 (2000); Lars Noah, What’s 
Wrong with “Constitutionalizing Food and Drug Law”?, 75 TUL. L. REV. 137, 144 & 
n.39, 148 (2000). 
 52. See Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 
295–96 (2001) (summarizing the factors considered by the Court); Blum v. Yaretsky, 
457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982) (“[O]ur precedents indicate that a State normally can be held 
responsible for a private decision only when it has exercised coercive power or has 
provided such significant encouragement, either overt or covert, that the choice must in 
law be deemed to be that of the State.”); id. at 1005–12 (holding that decisions made by 
private nursing homes to discharge or transfer Medicaid patients did not qualify as state 
action even though subject to extensive regulation); Gilliam E. Metzger, Privatization as 
Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 1410–21, 1446–52 (2003); id. at 1417 (noting 
“the Court’s prime insistence on government involvement in specific challenged acts”); 
id. at 1420 (“No doubt, the Supreme Court will clamp down when it perceives an effort 
by government to evade its constitutional obligations.”). 
 53. For example, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act, would apply.  See UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 
U.S. 187, 190, 192, 199, 211 (1991) (holding that a private employer could not exclude 
non-sterile female employees from work involving exposure to lead because of possible 
fetal harms); Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1268, 1271–72, 1276–
77 (W.D. Wash. 2001) (holding that a health insurer could not exclude coverage for 
contraceptives); Mary E. Becker, Can Employers Exclude Women to Protect Children?, 
264 JAMA 2113 (1990).  But see In re Union Pac. R.R. Employ. Prac. Litig., 479 F.3d 
936 (8th Cir. 2007) (disagreeing with the holding in Erickson). 
 54. See Walker v. Pierce, 560 F.2d 609, 611, 613 (4th Cir. 1977) (no state action 
where a physician insisted on sterilizing patients); see also Lawrence K. Altman, 
Medical Dilemma: Necessary Drugs with Intolerable Dangers, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 
1988, at C3 (“Many doctors also demand agreement from a patient before prescribing the 
drug that she would terminate a pregnancy that occurred while using it, although, of 
course, this could not be enforced.”); cf. supra note 38 and accompanying text 
(discussing a similar practice in connection with HIV-positive female patients).  At least 
one state statute governing fertility procedures prohibits such conditions.  See N.M. 
STAT. ANN. § 24-9A-1(D) (Supp. 2006) (providing that “no physician may stipulate that 
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Constitution would not prevent a pharmaceutical company from adopting a 
policy of supplying Accutane (or some other teratogen) only if a physician 
first agreed to adopt and enforce such a policy.55  If, however, a government 
agency directed a pharmaceutical company to proceed in such a fashion, 
then constitutional constraints would come into play.56
Although it appears that the FDA ordered the manufacturers of isotretinoin 
and thalidomide to implement restrictive distribution systems, the 
agency undoubtedly would argue that the companies took the initiative 
and “voluntarily” created the programs in question.  After all, the FDA lacks 
any delegated statutory authority to impose such conditions.  Nonetheless, it 
enjoys plenty of leverage to secure concessions from sponsors of new 
drugs when they apply for a marketing license,57 and courts might look 
beneath the surface to find state action in these cases.  The long history 
behind the Accutane restrictions, for instance, clearly indicates that the 
FDA pressured the manufacturer to adopt the increasingly burdensome 
conditions on access.58
In the alternative, the agency might take the position that, even if it 
effectively had ordered the companies to adopt these restrictions, it has 
no direct power to enforce them.  In the event of widespread noncompliance 
by physicians, pharmacists, or patients, the FDA could threaten to 
a woman must abort in the event the pregnancy should produce a deformed or 
handicapped child”). 
 55. Cf. Jamison v. Purdue Pharma Co., 251 F. Supp. 2d 1315, 1326–27 (S.D. Miss. 2003) 
(rejecting drug manufacturers’ effort to remove tort claims to federal court on the theory 
that they acted under the direction of federal officers); id. at 1326 (“[D]efendants 
have established only that they are participants in a highly regulated industry. . . .  [T]hey 
are for-profit corporations that do not derive their primary income from federal 
funding . . . [, and they] do not operate as a public utility under the direct control of the 
federal government.”).  But cf. Watson v. Philip Morris Cos., 420 F.3d 852 (8th Cir. 
2005) (allowing removal on such a theory), rev’d, 127 S. Ct. 2301 (2007). 
 56. Cf. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 614–15 (1989) 
(holding that federal rules specifying when and how private railroads must test their 
employees for substance abuse qualified as state action); Doe v. Charleston Area Med. 
Ctr., Inc., 529 F.2d 638, 642–44 (4th Cir. 1975) (holding that a private hospital’s policy 
against performing abortions satisfied state action requirements insofar as it was derived 
from a now unconstitutional state criminal statute). 
 57. See Lars Noah, Administrative Arm-Twisting in the Shadow of Congressional 
Delegations of Authority, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 873, 881–82.  In a recent op-ed piece, a 
former FDA official who had just left his post as deputy commissioner explained that 
risk management plans “already guide the use of about 30 marketed drugs as part of 
‘voluntary’ arrangements with drug companies.”  Scott Gottlieb, Prescription for 
Trouble, WALL ST. J., Mar. 6, 2007, at A19. 
 58. See supra notes 6–20 and accompanying text. 




withdraw the manufacturer’s license to sell the drug, but it could take no 
action against noncompliant providers or users.59  Once again, however, 
courts may find state action based on the agency’s indirect power to 
encourage the private manufacturer to take steps to enforce the conditions 
on access.  Otherwise, nothing other than a pharmaceutical manufacturer’s 
willingness to resist the FDA’s pressure would stand as an obstacle to 
the government’s ability to impose arguably unreasonable restrictions on 
patient access to drugs. 
These questions also may arise in connection with restrictive enrollment 
criteria for clinical trials of investigational products.  Putting aside research 
initiated or sponsored by federal funding agencies (which would simplify 
the state action issue), when a private entity (pharmaceutical company or 
academic institution) undertakes clinical trials of a potential teratogen, it 
may insist that women of childbearing age agree to undergo an abortion 
in the event of contraceptive failure.  Apparently this had happened in 
the testing of isotretinoin.60  Although the FDA first must grant an application 
for an investigational new drug (IND) exemption, it plays a largely 
passive role at this stage of the research and development process, so 
any such restrictions would have originated with the sponsor.61  In 
 59. See Noah, supra note 2, at 586, 592 n.99, 594; Marc Kaufman, Death After 
Abortion Pill Reignites Safety Debate, WASH. POST, Nov. 3, 2003, at A3 (reporting that 
the distribution restrictions for mifepristone have not been enforced); see also Planned 
Parenthood Cincinnati Region v. Taft, 444 F.3d 502 (6th Cir. 2006) (invalidating a state 
law that attempted to prevent the off-label use of mifepristone at lower dosages or later 
in pregnancy).  But cf. Doshi, supra note 9, at 659, 660 (assuming incorrectly that the 
FDA could sanction isotretinoin users who failed to comply with the restrictions).  This 
stands in stark contrast to the powers exercised by the Drug Enforcement Administration 
over controlled substances.  See Lars Noah, Ambivalent Commitments to Federalism in 
Controlling the Practice of Medicine, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 149, 177–85 (2004). 
 60. See Nancy Blodgett, Acne Control vs. Birth Defects: Accutane Spurs Lawsuits, 
Called Thalidomide of the ’80s, A.B.A. J., July 1, 1988, at 17, 18 (reporting that some 
research sites had excluded women while others insisted that female subjects agree to 
undergo an abortion in the event of contraceptive failure). 
 61. See FDA, Investigational New Drug Applications; Amendment to Clinical 
Hold Regulations for Products Intended for Life-Threatening Diseases and Conditions, 
65 Fed. Reg. 34,963, 34,965 (June 1, 2000).  The agency has issued guidelines that 
address the inclusion of women who might become pregnant.  See FDA, Guideline for 
the Study and Evaluation of Gender Differences in the Clinical Evaluation of Drugs, 58 
Fed. Reg. 39,406, 39,407–08 (July 22, 1993) (discussing its 1977 policy that had called 
for the exclusion of women of childbearing age from early phases of studies with 
investigational drugs); id. at 39,410 (rescinding this policy); id. at 39,411 (“[C]linical 
protocols should also include measures that will minimize the possibility of fetal 
exposure to the investigational drug.  These would ordinarily include providing for the 
use of a reliable method of contraception (or abstinence) for the duration of drug 
exposure (which may exceed the length of the study) . . . .”).  The agency’s guidelines 
have no binding effect, however.  See id. at 39,409; id. at 39,408 (“The agency 
recognizes that this change in FDA’s policy will not, by itself, cause drug companies or 
IRBs to alter restrictions they might impose on the participation of women of 
childbearing potential.”).  In contrast, the Department of Health and Human Services 
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addition, local institutional review boards (IRBs) must approve an 
experimental protocol before a clinical trial gets under way, but these 
entities generally also do not qualify as state actors.62  Thus, notwithstanding 
legitimate objections to the tradition of excluding women of childbearing 
age from clinical trials,63 persons denied the opportunity to enroll as 
subjects in privately sponsored research presumably could not invoke 
constitutional protections against discrimination.64
revised its regulations governing federally-funded biomedical research to encourage 
greater inclusion of women in clinical trials.  See HHS, Protection of Human Research 
Subjects, 66 Fed. Reg. 3878 (Jan. 17, 2001) (amending 45 C.F.R. pt. 46(B)).  See 
generally Karen H. Rothenberg, Gender Matters: Implications for Clinical Research and 
Women’s Health Care, 32 HOUS. L. REV. 1201, 1222–41, 1267–70 (1996). 
 62. See Missert v. Trs. of Boston Univ., 73 F. Supp. 2d 68, 70–73 (D. Mass. 1999) 
(dismissing constitutional claims asserted by a graduate student who was dismissed from 
a dentistry program where he premised state action solely on the federal requirements for 
IRB review of research that he had done for his thesis); Lars Noah, Deputizing 
Institutional Review Boards to Police (Audit?) Biomedical Research, 25 J. LEGAL MED. 
267, 276–79 & n.43 (2004).  For the most part, private health care facilities also need not 
fear constitutional claims.  See Annotation, Action of Private Hospital as State Action 
Under 42 USCS § 1983 or Fourteenth Amendment, 42 A.L.R. FED. 463, § 18(b) (1979 & 
Supp. 2006). 
 63. See Rebecca Dresser, Wanted: Single, White Male for Medical Research, 
HASTINGS CENTER REP., Jan.–Feb. 1992, at 24, 25 (“The possibility that a few women 
might become pregnant [after contraceptive failure], might choose against abortion, and 
might have a child who is harmed by exposure to an experimental intervention is too 
small to justify the current exclusionary practices.”); id. at 26 (arguing that, even if it 
made sense to exclude women of childbearing age from clinical trials involving potential 
teratogens that offer little promise of therapeutic benefit, fertile men should be excluded 
as well given the possibility of birth defects transmitted by sperm); Vanessa Merton, The 
Exclusion of Pregnant, Pregnable, and Once-Pregnable People (a.k.a. Women) from 
Biomedical Research, 19 AM. J.L. & MED. 369 (1993); L. Elizabeth Bowles, Note, The 
Disenfranchisement of Fertile Women in Clinical Trials: The Legal Ramifications of and 
Solutions for Rectifying the Knowledge Gap, 45 VAND. L. REV. 877, 895–907 (1992) 
(emphasizing this same point about the differential treatment of fertile male and female 
subjects in the course of trying to craft an Equal Protection objection to the FDA’s 
previous policy); id. at 909–10 (favoring a policy that would make contraception a 
condition of participation); Kathy George, UW to Study Prenatal Drug Use: Safety of 
Medicines for Pregnant Women a Neglected Research Area, SEATTLE POST-
INTELLIGENCER, July 26, 2004, at B1. 
 64. See R. Alta Charo, Protecting Us to Death: Women, Pregnancy, and Clinical 
Research Trials, 38 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 135, 166–67 (1993).  But see Rothenberg, supra 
note 61, at 1246 n.296, 1251–52 n.328; cf. Elaine W. v. Joint Diseases N. Gen. Hosp., 
Inc., 613 N.E.2d 523 (N.Y. 1993) (holding that a private hospital would have to establish 
a medical justification for its policy of excluding pregnant women from a drug treatment 
program to sustain it against a gender discrimination charge asserted under state statute); 
Megan R. Golden, Note, When Pregnancy Discrimination Is Gender Discrimination: 
The Constitutionality of Excluding Pregnant Women from Drug Treatment Programs, 66 




B. Identifying the Rights at Stake 
After satisfying the state action prerequisite for invoking the Constitution, 
someone seeking to challenge the FDA’s access restrictions would need 
to identify the right(s) at stake.  Until recently, courts consistently 
had rejected claims that persons had any special right of access to 
pharmaceutical products.  Although patients enjoyed an interest in making 
choices about their medical care, the government could decline to allow 
the sale of drugs until the manufacturer proved their safety and effectiveness.  
In 2006, however, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held 
that terminally ill patients sufficiently alleged that they enjoyed a 
fundamental right of access to promising therapeutic agents in advance 
of final approval, which meant that the FDA would have to demonstrate 
that its contrary policy represented the least restrictive means for serving 
a compelling governmental interest.65  As suggested in the accompanying 
dissent,66 the court’s astonishing decision represents a departure from the 
Supreme Court’s cautionary guidance about discovering new fundamental 
rights imbedded in the penumbra of the Bill of Rights.67
In contrast, the courts repeatedly have recognized fundamental rights 
involving procreative choices.68  Although normally framed as rights of 
access to contraceptives or abortions,69 the right to decline such interventions 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1832, 1867–68 (1991) (arguing that the policy challenged in Elaine W. 
grew from state action for purposes of bringing a federal constitutional challenge). 
 65. See Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach, 
445 F.3d 470 (D.C. Cir. 2006), vacated, No. 04-5350, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 28974 
(D.C. Cir. Nov. 21, 2006) (granting rehearing en banc). 
 66. See id. at 486 (Griffith, J., dissenting); see also Raich v. Gonzales, No. 03-
15481, 2007 WL 754759, at *8-12 (9th Cir. Mar. 14, 2007) (rejecting due process claim 
for access to medical marijuana); Cass R. Sunstein, Is There a Constitutional Right to 
Clone?, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 987, 994 (2002) (“[W]henever the government imposes 
barriers on the use of some medicine or medical technology, there is a disproportionate 
burden on those who believe that they need it.  By itself that burden is not enough to 
create a serious constitutional issue.”).  Shortly after the court granted a motion for 
rehearing en banc, the agency proposed amendments to liberalize its rules.  See FDA, 
Expanded Access to Investigational Drugs for Treatment Use, 71 Fed. Reg. 75,147 (Dec. 
14, 2006); FDA, Charging for Investigational Drugs, 71 Fed. Reg. 75,168 (Dec. 14, 
2006); Rob Stein, FDA Reveals Plan for Wider Access to Experimental Drugs, WASH. 
POST, Dec. 12, 2006, at A10. 
 67. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997).  See 
generally Daniel O. Conkle, Three Theories of Substantive Due Process, 85 N.C. L. REV. 
63 (2006); Brian Hawkins, Note, The Glucksberg Renaissance: Substantive Due Process 
Since Lawrence v. Texas, 105 MICH. L. REV. 409 (2006). 
 68. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564–66, 573–74 (2003); Hodgson 
v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 434 (1990) (“A woman’s decision to conceive or to bear a 
child is a component of her liberty that is protected by the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.”); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972). 
 69. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (“If the right to privacy 
means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from 
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seems even more straightforward and far less controversial.70  The issue 
becomes clearer still if the contraceptive method requires implantation 
and functions over a relatively long period of time, which would represent a 
form of temporary sterilization.  Notwithstanding the failure to overrule 
some of the older decisions upholding early twentieth century eugenics 
legislation, most observers doubt that state-mandated sterilization programs 
would survive today.71  After all, even without any procreative overtones, 
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as 
the decision whether to bear or beget a child.”); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 
(1965).  For this reason, some commentators have questioned predictions that the Court 
would extend the right to include novel reproductive strategies.  See Marsha Garrison, 
Law Making for Baby Making: An Interpretive Approach to the Determination of Legal 
Parentage, 113 HARV. L. REV. 835, 854–59 (2000); Note, Human Cloning and Substantive 
Due Process, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2348, 2354 (1998) (“Despite the Court’s occasional 
references to a broader principle of reproductive freedom, the Court has not truly tested a 
right to procreate.” (footnote omitted)). 
 70. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977) (“The decision 
whether or not to beget or bear a child . . . holds a particularly important place in the 
history of the right of privacy. . . .  [The] decision whether to accomplish or prevent 
conception [is] among the most private and sensitive.”); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 497 
(Goldberg, J., concurring) (“[If] a law outlawing voluntary birth control by married persons is 
valid, then, by the same reasoning, a law requiring compulsory birth control also would 
seem to be valid.  In my view, however, both types of law would unjustifiably intrude 
upon rights of marital privacy which are constitutionally protected.”).  As the Court later 
explained: 
The soundness of this [procreative liberty] prong of the Roe analysis is apparent 
from a consideration of the alternative.  If indeed the woman’s interest in 
deciding whether to bear and beget a child had not been recognized as in Roe, 
the State might as readily restrict a woman’s right to choose to carry a 
pregnancy to term as to terminate it, to further asserted state interests in 
population control, or eugenics, for example.  Yet Roe has been sensibly relied 
upon to counter any such suggestions. 
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 859 (1992). 
 71. See Michael G. Silver, Note, Eugenics and Compulsory Sterilization Laws: 
Providing Redress for the Victims of a Shameful Era in United States History, 72 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 862, 866–84 (2004) (tracing the judiciary’s failure to overrule Buck v. 
Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927), which had upheld a state’s authority to sterilize the “feeble-
minded,” but arguing that such laws unconstitutionally interfere with fundamental rights 
associated with procreation subsequently recognized by the Court); see also Skinner v. 
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 539–41 (1942) (invalidating a statute authorizing sterilization 
of habitual offenders, recognizing a fundamental right to procreate but basing the 
decision on Equal Protection grounds because it drew arbitrary distinctions among 
crimes that could lead to this sanction); Paul A. Lombardo, Medicine, Eugenics, and the 
Supreme Court: From Coercive Sterilization to Reproductive Freedom, 13 J. CONTEMP. 
HEALTH L. & POL’Y 1, 7–8, 24 (1996); Mike Anton, Forced Sterilization Once Seen as 
Path to a Better World, L.A. TIMES, July 16, 2003, at A1.  After all, persons may qualify 
for political asylum in the U.S. when they flee other countries (such as China) because of 
population control policies that include state-ordered abortion and sterilization.  See 8 




persons enjoy rights of bodily integrity that would allow them to decline 
unwanted medical interventions unless the state had some powerful 
justification.72  Even if a pregnancy might imperil a woman’s life, it 
would be hard to imagine the state having any compelling reason for 
mandating the use of contraception in the face of a competent patient’s 
refusal.73
The First Amendment also might come into play.  After all, objections 
to contraception and abortion often spring from strongly held religious 
beliefs.  Nonetheless, the FDA’s access restrictions offer patients the 
alternative of agreeing to remain abstinent, and, even if the government 
decided to eliminate that option (or, to pose the issue in starker terms, 
insisted on an abortion in the event of pregnancy), the Free Exercise 
Clause does not require state actors to craft special exceptions to laws of 
general application.74  Separately, some physicians and pharmacists may 
object on First Amendment grounds, complaining that the government 
compels them to distribute information recommending the use of 
contraceptives (which might offend their religious scruples even if 
abstinence remains an alternative) or else lose the opportunity to prescribe 
and dispense certain teratogenic drugs.  The coerced speech argument 
has not, however, succeeded in similar medical settings (though lacking 
the overlay of the provider’s or recipient’s religious objections).75
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(B) (2000); Megan C. Dempsey, Note, A Misplaced Bright-Line 
Rule: Coercive Population Control in China and Asylum for Unmarried Partners, 92 
IOWA L. REV. 213, 216–20 (2006). 
 72. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997); cf. Washington v. Harper, 
494 U.S. 210 (1990) (recognizing, however, that the state may have a valid competing 
interest where the patient is in its custody as a prison inmate). 
 73. Cf. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (recognizing that 
the state may have a valid competing interest where the patient lacks the capacity to 
decide whether to refuse life-sustaining care). 
 74. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (rejecting a free 
exercise claim by a Native American employee fired after ingesting peyote, a Schedule I 
hallucinogenic substance); see also Carol M. Kaplan, Note, The Devil Is in the Details: 
Neutral, Generally Applicable Laws and Exceptions from Smith, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1045 (2000).  Congress enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act in an effort to 
resurrect the strict scrutiny previously recognized under the free exercise clause.  See, 
e.g., Gonzales v. O Centro Espírita Beneficente União do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006) 
(holding that the government had failed to demonstrate that its asserted interest in the 
uniform application of the Controlled Substances Act was sufficiently compelling to 
justify a prohibition on the sacramental use of hoasca, a tea containing the Schedule I 
hallucinogen dimethyltryptamine, in part because the federal government has long made 
an exception for the use of peyote by Native Americans). 
 75. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992) 
(plurality opinion) (“All that is left of petitioners’ argument is an asserted First 
Amendment right of a physician not to provide information about the risks of abortion, 
and childbirth, in a manner mandated by the State. . . .  We see no constitutional 
infirmity in the requirement that the physician provide the information mandated by the 
State here.”).  Scholars have critiqued the Court’s analysis.  See, e.g., Paula Berg, 
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In the past few years, “conscientious objection” by pharmacists in 
refusing to dispense contraceptives has attracted a great deal of attention.  
Some state legislatures have protected such choices while others have 
attempted to prohibit this sort of behavior.76  Other health care professionals 
undoubtedly can decline to prescribe contraceptives or assist with 
abortions,77 and patients who share in these views may find such environments 
more appealing, while other patients would remain free to seek out 
family planning services elsewhere.78  The FDA’s access restrictions 
might, however, effectively prevent such conscientious objectors from 
Toward a First Amendment Theory of Doctor-Patient Discourse and the Right to Receive 
Unbiased Medical Advice, 74 B.U. L. REV. 201, 224–25, 235–43, 247–50, 256–65 
(1994); id. at 266 (“[R]egulations that compel physician speech may subvert patients’ 
audience-based interests if they . . . advance a particular viewpoint regarding medical 
treatment or how a patient should respond to a certain diagnosis . . . .”); id. at 250 n.242 
(“For example, patients who oppose the use of artificial contraception would likely feel 
trapped and offended if forced to listen to their physician deliver a speech expressing the 
government’s view that women ought to practice artificial birth control.”). 
 76. See, e.g., Rob Stein, A Medical Crisis of Conscience: Faith Drives Some to 
Refuse Patients Medication or Care, WASH. POST, July 16, 2006, at A1; Rob Stein, 
Health Workers’ Choice Debated: Proposals Back Right Not to Treat, WASH. POST, Jan. 
30, 2006, at A1; see also Menges v. Blagojevich, 451 F. Supp. 2d 992 (C.D. Ill. 2006) 
(allowing pharmacists to challenge a state regulation requiring them to dispense 
emergency contraceptives).  See generally Julie Cantor & Ken Baum, The Limits of 
Conscientious Objection—May Pharmacists Refuse to Fill Prescriptions for Emergency 
Contraception?, 351 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2008 (2004); Melissa Duvall, Comment, 
Pharmacy Conscience Clause Statutes: Constitutional Religious “Accommodations” or 
Unconstitutional “Substantial Burdens” on Women?, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 1485 (2006); 
Jed Miller, Note, The Unconscionability of Conscience Clauses: Pharmacists’ Consciences 
and Women’s Access to Contraception, 16 HEALTH MATRIX 237 (2006). 
 77. See Lynn D. Wardle, Protecting the Rights of Conscience of Health Care 
Providers, 14 J. LEGAL MED. 177 (1993) (surveying “conscience clauses” enacted in the 
states, and editorializing that these laws generally do not go far enough in securing the 
rights of conscientious objectors); id. at 180 (finding that “45 American jurisdictions 
provide at least some protection for some health care providers to decline to provide or 
perform some abortions, 10 states cover contraception, [and] seven jurisdictions include 
sterilization”); Natalie Langlois, Note, Life-Sustaining Treatment Law: A Model for 
Balancing a Woman’s Reproductive Rights with a Pharmacist’s Conscientious 
Objection, 47 B.C. L. REV. 815, 825–32 (2006); Katherine A. White, Note, Crisis of 
Conscience: Reconciling Religious Health Care Providers’ Beliefs and Patients’ Rights, 
51 STAN. L. REV. 1703, 1707–17 (1999). 
 78. See Rob Stein, Medical Practices Blend Health and Faith: Doctors, Patients 
Distance Themselves from Care They Consider Immoral, WASH. POST, Aug. 31, 2006, at 
A1 (describing the emergence of “natural family planning” clinics that reject any use of 
contraceptives); see also Rob Stein, Institute Practices Reproductive Medicine—and 
Catholicism, WASH. POST, Oct. 31, 2006, at A14. 




ever selecting—and perhaps their patients from ever even learning 
about79—teratogenic drugs available to treat a disease or other condition. 
C. Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine 
Even if someone seeking to challenge the access restrictions 
succeeded in asserting that they enjoyed some fundamental right, they 
would still have to establish that state action threatened to deprive them 
of the opportunity to exercise this right.  The state has not, for instance, 
ordered contraception for (or sterilization of) persons likely to transmit 
infectious or genetic diseases.80  Moreover, the FDA has not told women 
of childbearing age that they can never use these teratogenic drugs; 
instead, it has insisted that they promise to avoid becoming pregnant 
before using such drugs.  A person seeking to challenge such a requirement 
would have to invoke the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, which 
asks whether the government inappropriately demands that an individual 
forego exercising a constitutionally protected right in order to secure 
access to a benefit. 
The doctrine recognizes that, even without coercion, persons often 
face seriously constrained choices and that the government’s offer of 
some benefit may encourage waivers of their rights without valid 
consent.  The U.S. Supreme Court has employed the unconstitutional 
conditions doctrine in resolving challenges to state denials of unemployment 
benefits to individuals who decline to work on their sabbath,81 state 
 79. See Farr A. Curlin et al., Religion, Conscience, and Controversial Clinical 
Practices, 356 NEW ENG. J. MED. 593, 597 (2007) (“If physicians’ ideas translate into 
their practices, then 14% of patients—more than 40 million Americans—may be cared 
for by physicians who do not believe they are obligated to disclose information about 
medically available treatments they consider objectionable.”). 
 80. See John A. Robertson, Norplant and Irresponsible Reproduction, HASTINGS 
CENTER REP., Jan.–Feb. 1995, at S23, S25 (“At present this discussion is largely 
hypothetical, because no one has proposed that HIV-positive women or those at genetic 
risk should be penalized for reproduction or failure to accept Norplant.”); see also John 
A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and Human Genetics, 39 EMORY L.J. 697, 716 (1990) 
(doubting that the government could mandate genetic screening); Sonia Mateu Suter, The 
Routinization of Prenatal Testing, 28 AM. J.L. & MED. 233, 269 (2002) (arguing that, as 
voluntary genetic screening has become routine, “a new, more subtle form of eugenics is 
currently emerging at the individual level”); cf. Elisabeth Rosenthal, Scientists Debate 
China’s Law on Sterilizing the Carriers of Genetic Defects, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 1998, 
§ 1, at 14.  If screening for homozygous recessive conditions such as cystic fibrosis, Tay 
Sachs disease, or sickle-cell anemia revealed that both potential parents were carriers, 
then they would have a 25% chance of bearing a child suffering from such a disease, 
which does not differ appreciably from the risk of serious birth defects that the FDA 
thought necessitated contraception when using certain teratogenic drugs. 
 81. See, e.g., Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 480 U.S. 136, 146 
(1987); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963); see also Speiser v. Randall, 357 
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prohibitions on office-holding by ministers,82 and federal restrictions on 
editorializing as a condition for receiving public broadcasting subsidies.83  
Because of its inconsistent application by the Court, the unconstitutional 
conditions doctrine has attracted a great deal of scholarly attention.84  
Commentators have suggested a number of competing formulations,85 
but the Supreme Court has not explicitly embraced any of these approaches.86
What if the government demanded contraceptive use as a condition of 
Medicaid reimbursement for drugs that create a risk of birth defects?87  
In fact, Medicare has begun to insist that beneficiaries seeking coverage 
of certain medical devices agree to participate in post-approval safety 
and efficacy studies.88  The Medicaid condition hypothesized here 
U.S. 513, 518–19 (1958) (holding that the denial of a state tax exemption to persons 
advocating the overthrow of the government represented an unconstitutional condition). 
 82. See McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 626–29 (1978) (plurality opinion). 
 83. See FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 399–401 (1984). 
 84. See, e.g., Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion Without Baselines: Unconstitutional 
Conditions in Three Dimensions, 90 GEO. L.J. 1 (2001); Daniel A. Farber, Another View 
of the Quagmire: Unconstitutional Conditions and Contract Theory, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 913 (2006). 
 85. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413 
(1989) (canvassing several different theories based on notions of coercion, corruption, 
and commodification, and offering instead a “systemic” theory calling for strict scrutiny 
of rights-pressuring conditions on government benefits because they skew the distribution 
of power between and among the government and the governed). 
 86. See Lynn A. Baker, The Prices of Rights: Toward A Positive Theory of 
Unconstitutional Conditions, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1185, 1195 (1990) (noting that all 
recent commentators concede that “the Court has yet to arrive, explicitly or implicitly, at 
a clear limiting principle for deciding challenges to conditions on government benefits”). 
 87. Cf. Judy Berlfein, Genetic Testing: Health Care Trap, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 30, 
1990, at B2 (reporting that an HMO threatened to drop a pregnant woman’s coverage 
after she received a positive prenatal test for cystic fibrosis unless she underwent an 
abortion). 
 88. See Gina Kolata, Medicare Covering New Treatments, but with a Catch, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 5, 2004, at A1; Rick Weiss, Medicare to Cover Cardiac Device: Plan 
Raises Issue of Line Between Care and Research, WASH. POST, Jan. 20, 2005, at A1 
(explaining that this “represents the most aggressive effort yet to use the federal 
insurance plan for the elderly as a backdoor way to learn more about what works and 
what does not in medicine”); see also Steven D. Pearson et al., Medicare’s Requirement 
for Research Participation as a Condition of Coverage: Is It Ethical?, 296 JAMA 988 
(2006) (defending this approach).  In fact, the isotretinoin and thalidomide registration 
requirements operate in much the same fashion by enrolling patients in an 
epidemiological study of pregnancy rates and outcomes.  See Michael Kranish, New 
Use Is Found for Thalidomide: Fighting Cancer, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 20, 2002, at A28 
(reporting objections that BU’s initial policing role under STEPS was unduly coercive); 
supra note 13; see also FDA, General Information About Pregnancy Exposure 
Registries, http://www.fda.gov/womens/registries (last visited Apr. 30, 2007); Honein et 




unmistakably involves state action, though it looks more like a nonsubsidy 
than a penalty because a woman receiving public assistance for drug 
coverage would remain free (in theory) to refuse contraception and pay 
for the drug out of pocket.89  The actual condition of access imposed by 
the FDA operates more strongly, however, than a simple government 
decision not to subsidize use of a particular drug. 
If courts began to view access to therapeutic agents as protected by the 
Constitution, then contraception requirements would amount to a double 
whammy, forcing patients to choose which of two fundamental rights to 
sacrifice in order to secure the other right.90  Furthermore, if access to 
therapeutic agents qualified as a fundamental right, then the differential 
impact of contraception as a condition of access might pose Equal 
Protection questions.91  The concern becomes even clearer if the agency 
adopted a broader restriction linked to the patient’s sex (for example, 
altogether prohibiting use by women of childbearing years, as often 
happens in clinical trials with investigational new drugs that may cause 
birth defects).92  Because gender only qualifies as a quasi-suspect 
classification triggering heightened scrutiny, however, the government 
probably would manage to justify such restrictions.93
D. Applying Strict Scrutiny 
Lastly, even if (indirect) state action (indirectly) threatens to infringe 
upon some fundamental right(s), the constitutional inquiry allows the 
government to try and justify its action.  If strict scrutiny applied, the 
al., supra note 16, at 1073 (discussing a pregnancy registry for antiepileptic drugs); Uhl 
et al., supra note 26, at 890. 
 89. Cf. Mem’l Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974) (holding that the 
state cannot deny a benefit (for example, access to medical care) because an otherwise 
eligible person had exercised a fundamental right (to travel, for example)). 
 90. See supra note 40 (making a similar point in connection with pelvic exams as a 
condition for access to contraceptives). 
 91. For instance, women with cystic acne would face a difficult choice not forced 
on men with the same disease (even if the patient’s male partner might have to use a 
contraceptive in order to satisfy the condition).  In contrast, for drugs such as 
thalidomide that have teratogenic potential whether used by a male or female patient, the 
government would have drawn no classification based on sex. 
 92. Cf. January W. Payne, Forever Pregnant: Guidelines—Treat Nearly All 
Women as Pre-Pregnant, WASH. POST, May 16, 2006, at F1 (discussing new CDC 
recommendations for “preconception care” designed to ensure that all women who might 
become pregnant adhere to prenatal care guidelines during the window of time before 
confirmation of pregnancy). 
 93. Cf. Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 
515, 533–34 (1996) (“The heightened review standard our precedent establishes does not 
make sex a proscribed classification. . . .  But such classifications may not be used . . . to 
create or perpetuate the legal, social, and economic inferiority of women.”); Bray v. 
Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 271 (1993). 
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agency would need to demonstrate that its conditions on access represented 
the least restrictive means for achieving a compelling governmental 
interest.94  State actors rarely prevail once a court decides to use strict 
scrutiny,95 though usually because they struggle to satisfy the least 
restrictive means requirement.  In the case of teratogenic drugs, however 
(and somewhat counterintuitively), the ends prong may be trickier: even 
though the state may seek to minimize the risks of in utero exposure to 
teratogens, the state may not have a compelling interest in preventing the 
birth of a child so exposed.96  If it did, then the least restrictive means 
prong should not pose much of a problem.  After all, at least in the case 
of Accutane, the FDA proceeded deliberately (some would say too 
slowly), incrementally adding ever more burdensome conditions on 
access after it realized that the previous effort had not worked as well as 
hoped. 
Some scholars have taken the position that safeguarding unconceived 
offspring from the risk of fetal injuries would not qualify as a 
compelling interest because children born with unavoidable birth defects 
are still better off alive.97  This view coincides with the judicial hostility 
 94. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 686 (1977) (“[W]here 
a decision as fundamental as that whether to bear or beget a child is involved, regulations 
imposing a burden on it may be justified only by compelling state interests, and must be 
narrowly drawn to express only those interests.”). 
 95. See Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis 
of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 800–09, 869–71 (2006) 
(summarizing the conventional wisdom about strict scrutiny, but finding that in recent 
years, depending on various circumstances, some laws survive the test). 
 96. Cf. Charo, supra note 64, at 154 (“Even if excluding pregnant women 
intending to go to term from all nontherapeutic research can be justified on the grounds 
of fetal protection, excluding all fertile but not currently pregnant women certainly 
cannot . . . .”). 
 97. See Jan C. Heller, Religious Perspectives on Human Cloning: Revisiting Safety 
as a Moral Constraint, 32 VAL. U. L. REV. 661, 663–69, 676–77 (1998) (referring to this 
paradox as the problem of the “contingent future person”); John A. Robertson, Embryos, 
Families, and Procreative Liberty: The Legal Structure of the New Reproduction, 59 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 939, 987–93 (1986); John A. Robertson, Liberty, Identity, and Human 
Cloning, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1371, 1405–08 (1998); John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty 
and the Control of Conception, Pregnancy, and Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REV. 405, 435 
(1983); Michael H. Shapiro, How (Not) to Think About Surrogacy and Other 
Reproductive Innovations, 28 U.S.F. L. REV. 647, 672–73 (1994).  In an article that 
proposed restricting access to fertility drugs, I argued that this premise did not apply to 
avoidable prenatal injuries caused by multifetal pregnancies.  See Noah, supra note 3, at 
659–65; see also Dan W. Brock, Procreative Liberty, 74 TEX. L. REV. 187, 202–05 
(1995) (book review) (criticizing Professor Robertson’s claim that any harm done to 
children born through assisted reproductive technologies would not justify state 




to “wrongful life” claims brought on behalf of such children.98  A physician 
may face liability for neglecting to disclose the teratogenic potential of a 
prescribed drug, but the courts in such cases assume that the risk 
information would have caused the patient to avoid using the drug rather 
than to avoid becoming pregnant (hence, an avoidable birth defect).99  
Thus, if a physician prescribed isotretinoin to a woman of childbearing 
years without revealing the risk of congenital abnormalities, then the 
physician has breached the duty to secure informed consent and may 
face liability for the resulting injuries to the child.  If, however, the 
physician fully disclosed the risk but allegedly failed to take reasonable 
steps to ensure that the patient would not become pregnant, then courts 
would not allow recovery for any injuries to the child.100
Under that view, the FDA has a legitimate interest in ensuring that 
pharmaceutical manufacturers accurately disclose the teratogenic potential 
of drug products but does not have a compelling interest that would 
justify taking additional steps designed to prevent the conception and 
birth of children by a woman after she has decided to use such a drug.  
In making risk-benefit judgments and labeling decisions, the FDA 
routinely takes into account the possibility of adverse impacts on the 
interference); Ronald M. Green, Parental Autonomy and the Obligation Not to Harm 
One’s Child Genetically, 25 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 5, 10 (1997); Philip G. Peters, Jr., 
Protecting the Unconceived: Nonexistence, Avoidability, and Reproductive Technology, 
31 ARIZ. L. REV. 487, 508–19, 524, 546–48 (1989). 
 98. See, e.g., Grubbs v. Barbourville Family Health Ctr., 120 S.W.3d 682 (Ky. 
2003); Kassama v. Magat, 792 A.2d 1102, 1115–23 (Md. 2002); id. at 1116–17 
(explaining that twenty-eight other states had rejected wrongful life claims while only 
three had allowed limited recovery in such cases); Hester v. Dwivedi, 733 N.E.2d 1161 
(Ohio 2000); Willis v. Wu, 607 S.E.2d 63 (S.C. 2004).  But cf. Harbeson v. Parke Davis, 
Inc., 746 F.2d 517, 523–25 & n.4 (9th Cir. 1984) (affirming judgment for plaintiffs on an 
informed consent claim where the physicians had failed to advise an epilepsy patient of 
the teratogenicity of Dilantin after she specifically had inquired about such risks in order 
to decide whether to attempt to conceive). 
 99. See, e.g., Hogle v. Hall, 916 P.2d 814, 816–17 (Nev. 1996) (Accutane). 
 100. In one recent Accutane case, the court drew precisely this distinction: 
Given that Mr. Gerber cannot recover on a theory that, had Roche provided 
certain precautions, he would not have been born, Mr. Gerber can only argue 
that Shirley Gerber would not have taken Accutane in the first place if Roche’s 
warning had been adequate.  In order to prove causation under the circumstances 
presented in this case, Plaintiff must demonstrate that an alternative warning would 
have changed the physician’s decision to prescribe Accutane or would have altered 
Shirley Gerber’s decision to take the drug for her severe acne condition. 
Gerber v. Hoffmann-La Roche Inc., 392 F. Supp. 2d 907, 920 (S.D. Tex. 2005); id. at 
921 (“A different warning may have altered Shirley Gerber’s birth control plan to better 
avoid pregnancy, but, as noted above, the net result of this argument is that Plaintiff 
would not have been born, a ‘wrongful life’ theory which is not cognizable in Texas.”); 
see also Walker v. Mart, 790 P.2d 735, 740 (Ariz. 1990) (“If her parents had decided to 
conceive, despite knowledge of probable congenital defects, the law would recognize no 
action on Christy’s behalf against them.”). 
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unborn.101  Thus, if the agency decided to withdraw its approval of a 
teratogen, then (putting aside the possibility of a constitutional right of 
drug access) disappointed patients probably would have no constitutional 
grounds for objecting.102  The greater power does not, however, invariably 
include the lesser power to condition access on the forfeiture of a 
patient’s constitutional rights.103  If preventing the birth of injured children 
does not qualify as a compelling interest, then the FDA’s access restrictions 
would amount to unconstitutional conditions.104
 101. See Gail H. Javitt & Kathy Hudson, Regulating (for the Benefit of) Future 
Persons: A Different Perspective on the FDA’s Jurisdiction to Regulate Human 
Reproductive Cloning, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 1201, 1222–27; id. at 1221–22 (“[A]s far 
back as 1962, there has been a tacit presumption that the FDA’s regulatory jurisdiction 
over articles intended ‘for use in man’ includes both current and future persons, and that 
its mandate extends to protecting the safety of future persons who may be exposed to a 
regulated product . . . .”); Noah, supra note 3, at 662–63 (“The FDA routinely regulates 
pharmaceutical products in ways designed to minimize the risks of fetal injuries and 
malformations. . . .  [T]he FDA clearly—even if some would say unreflectively—views 
harms to the unborn as relevant hazards of an intervention.”); Peters, supra note 97, at 
488, 537–38 (explaining that the FDA applies a more stringent standard for measuring 
risks and benefits of drugs that may affect the unborn); see also Berg, supra note 75, at 
263 (arguing that the First Amendment would not prevent the government from directing 
physicians to discuss risks that drugs may pose to the fetus); David Brown, Blood-
Pressure Drugs Linked to Birth Defects, WASH. POST, June 8, 2006, at A12 (reporting 
that the FDA will consider expanded pregnancy warnings for ACE inhibitors after a 
review of one state’s Medicaid records uncovered a significant increase in the risk of 
birth defects when taken during the first trimester); Pregnant Women Warned About 
Paxil, WASH. POST, Dec. 1, 2006, at A8. 
 102. See Peters, supra note 97, at 544–45 (“Drug disapproval is certainly a lesser 
violation of parental privacy and bodily integrity than forced sterilization or abortion.”); 
id. at 519 (“Is there any doubt that the [FDA] would disapprove a fertility drug that 
produced birth defects similar to those associated with thalidomide even if the alternative 
for the affected children was nonexistence?”). 
 103. See Brooks R. Fudenberg, Unconstitutional Conditions and Greater Powers: A 
Separability Approach, 43 UCLA L. REV. 371, 519 (1995) (concluding that, although the 
greater-includes-the-lesser argument makes sense, heightened judicial scrutiny is 
appropriate in those cases where a lesser power is separated from the greater power 
along a constitutionally protected dimension); John H. Garvey, The Powers and the 
Duties of Government, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 209, 215–19 (1989) (discussing the 
limitations of this argument); Michael Herz, Justice Byron White and the Argument that 
the Greater Includes the Lesser, 1994 BYU L. REV. 227, 238–49 (same). 
 104. Cf. Andrew Zoltan, Comment, Jacobson Revisited: Mandatory Polio Vaccination 
as an Unconstitutional Condition, 13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 735 (2005) (arguing that, 
once an infectious disease such as smallpox has been eradicated, mandatory 
immunizations no longer serve a public health purpose and, if made a prerequisite for 
access to public education, would violate the unconstitutional conditions doctrine).  The 
requirement for a negative pregnancy test should, however, survive because it does not 
involve sacrificing any fundamental right and, even if it did, the condition appears to 
serve the compelling interest of preventing avoidable birth defects insofar as a positive 





Who can argue with the goal of avoiding prenatal injuries, and who 
can fail to appreciate the FDA’s frustration over the seeming inability of 
users to guard against becoming pregnant when taking a drug that poses 
a serious risk of teratogenicity?  Even so, the agency may have crossed a 
constitutional line when it in effect required that patients first agree to 
use contraceptives as a condition of access to one of these drugs.  If 
anyone ever challenged this risk management strategy, a court would 
have to decide whether the policy grew out of state action, involved the 
exercise of a fundamental right, inappropriately conditioned access to a 
benefit on the waiver of one of these rights, and failed to serve a 
compelling governmental interest.  Each of these steps in the analysis 
has undoubted weaknesses, and perhaps in the aggregate they would 
defeat an effort to challenge the distribution restrictions on constitutional 
grounds.  Nonetheless, the FDA’s recent efforts to impose such conditions 
raise serious enough questions about burdening procreative rights that 
these initiatives deserve closer attention than they have received to this 
point. 
 
test would deprive the patient of access to the drug rather than force the patient to forego 
the right to become pregnant once on the drug.  Conversely, labeling that urged patients 
to consider an abortion in the event of exposure, which conflicts with the professional 
norm of “non-directive” counseling in connection with prenatal testing for genetic 
defects, might fail strict scrutiny (for example, if conscientious objectors declined to 
supply teratogens accompanied by such patient labeling). 
